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On 1 December 2019 the new European Commission, led 
by President Ursula von der Leyen, took office. One of its 
key priorities is to create a stronger Europe in the world. 
While in 2014 her predecessor Jean-Claude Juncker had 
announced a ‘political Commission’, von der Leyen has 
promised that hers would be a ‘geopolitical Commission’. 
For this purpose, the new High Representative and Vice-
President (HR/VP) Josep Borrell has been tasked with 
coordinating the external dimension of the work of all 
Commissioners in order to make it more coherent and 
strategic. But what exactly does a ‘geopolitical 
Commission’ entail? Will the EU learn the ‘language of 
power’ and behave more like other great powers?  
Great power rivalry: a new kid on the bloc? 
French President Macron recently warned that in the long 
run the EU might ‘disappear geopolitically’ if it did not 
wake up to the challenges of an increasingly hostile world 
(The Economist, 2019). In his view, Europe is fragile with 
the United States (US) seemingly turning its back on it 
under President Trump, an assertive China rising under a 
more authoritarian President Xi, and other strongmen like 
Russian President Putin on the EU’s doorsteps. The United 
Kingdom’s departure is not conducive to boost the EU’s 
geopolitical influence either. 
Geopolitics lacks an agreed definition but can generally be 
understood as ‘great power rivalry’, which tends to view 
influence as a zero-sum contest of control over territorial 
(and increasingly also virtual) spaces, and does not 
separate economic from political or even military tools in 
this competition. 
Although economic and security questions are increasingly 
intertwined, the EU’s external economic policies and its 
foreign and security policies have remained rather 
insulated. By contrast, China’s one-party system does not 
treat the economic realm as separate from the geopolitical 
spheres. The US under President Trump has also become 
more willing to unilaterally leverage its power to secure 
certain policy outcomes, even to the detriment of the 
international rules-based system and EU interests. Finally, 
Russia’s limited economic clout did not prevent it from the 
annexation of Crimea and involvement in the war in 
eastern Ukraine and elsewhere.  
The EU has embarked on various responses to this new 
multidimensional constellation of conflicts. In the words of 
HR/VP Josep Borrell (2020), “Europeans must deal with the 
world as it is, not as they wish it to be. And that means 
relearning the language of power and combining the 
European Union’s resources in a way that maximises their 
geopolitical impact”. A geopolitical Commission can thus 
be expected to engage in what other great powers are 
Executive Summary 
> The European Commission under President Ursula 
von der Leyen has branded itself as a ‘geopolitical 
Commission’. Does this imply a geopolitical turn in 
the external action of the European Union (EU)? 
> According to High Representative Josep Borrell, the 
EU needs to learn the ‘language of power’ so as to 
translate its resources into geopolitical impact. First 
fledgling signs of a search for more economic 
sovereignty, strategic autonomy, leadership and 
‘weaponised’ trade have emerged already in recent 
years. Many of these initiatives still need to be 
implemented while new ones are being added.  
> Geopolitical EU external action implies a more 
integrated external action. It also means reinforcing 
the EU’s resilience against external pressure, while 
not neglecting ‘geopolitical cooperation’ in the face 
of geopolitical competition. The geopolitical 
Commission will have to find a ‘European way’ to 
deal with great power challenges in line with the 
EU’s capabilities and values.  
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doing when it comes to levering economic weight: 
‘weaponising’ trade, that is, using it as a coercive tool to 
achieve strategic influence, enhancing economic 
sovereignty and strategic autonomy, and striving for 
technological supremacy and leadership.  
This policy brief takes stock of some major current 
challenges and EU responses and argues that the Union 
will need to pursue a more integrated, coherent external 
action while finding its own way to approach geopolitics.  
Trade policy: towards weaponisation? 
In trade the EU is a power equal to the US and China, 
making this field of exclusive competence a likely 
candidate for a geopolitical approach. So far, however, 
trade has not really been used as a ‘weapon’ – except in 
the case of sanctions against Russia.  
By putting ‘America First’, US President Trump has not only 
triggered a ‘trade war’ with China, but to a lesser extent 
also with the EU after ending the negotiations on a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. With his 
strategy, Trump is seeking to ‘decouple’ its economy from 
China and instrumentalise trade policy for strategic 
influence and security gains. The EU approach is less 
confrontational and rather aims to retain its openness to 
trade with China (and the US) while taking measures to 
better defend its economic interests. In a joint 
Communication, the European Commission and HR/VP 
(2019, 1) for the first time referred to China as being 
“simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation 
partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, 
a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a 
balance of interests, an economic competitor in the 
pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival 
promoting alternative models of governance”. The EU’s 
goal is not to contain China and decouple their economies 
but to “develop a more balanced and reciprocal economic 
relationship” (ibid., 6). 
Among the EU tools in this regard are the new screening 
mechanism for foreign direct investment, reformed trade 
defence instruments (including a new anti-dumping 
methodology which no longer distinguishes between 
market and non-market economies), a strategy for the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
in third countries, the proposed International 
Procurement Instrument as well as the recently created 
position of Chief Trade Enforcement Officer. Some 
member states, in particular France, Germany, Italy and 
Poland, would also like to reform EU competition law, 
especially anti-trust rules, in order to facilitate cross-
border mergers and create European champions which 
can compete with rivals from China and the United States.  
Most of these initiatives predate the von der Leyen 
Commission. A major test will thus be the reform of 
competition and industrial policies.  
Closely related to the trade challenge is the question of the 
EU’s economic sovereignty. 
Finance: towards economic sovereignty?  
The empowerment of the Euro is still at the very 
beginning. The Euro has become the second international 
currency after the US dollar. Yet it is far from playing the 
central role of the latter, nor can the EU match the place 
of the American financial system in the global financial 
architecture.  
President Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal with 
Iran (supported by the EU, China and Russia) in 2018 and 
the threat of secondary US sanctions against any company 
that does business with Iran have forcefully revealed the 
EU’s vulnerability. The efforts of EU member states to set 
up a special-purpose vehicle called INSTEX (Instrument in 
Support of Trade Exchanges) to help EU companies engage 
in business with Iran by facilitating non-dollar transactions 
and bypass US sanctions did not work.  
Also in light of this experience, the Commission (2018a) 
has made proposals to strengthen the international role of 
the Euro, including the creation of a unified seat for the 
Euro area in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the promotion of the use of the Euro for transactions in 
the energy, aircraft and commodities sectors.  
The US continues to hold a dominant position in the IMF 
and World Bank while China is still underrepresented and 
Europe overrepresented. China has strongly promoted the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New 
Development Bank as possible alternative venues. In late 
2018 China and Russia have agreed on building a new 
bilateral payment system to boost the use of their national 
currencies and cut their reliance on the US dollar.  
Pisani-Ferry and Wolff (2019: 9) argue that “[b]uilding 
economic sovereignty … requires the EU to stop thinking 
and acting as a ’fragmented power’” that ignores 
geopolitical considerations. In their view, the EU also needs 
to consider the promotion of a development bank and 
balance-of-payment assistance to third countries, for 
instance by giving an external role to the European 
Investment Bank or the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and the European Stability Mechanism. 
The proposals to strengthen the EU’s economic 
sovereignty are currently awaiting implementation. A 
similar situation can be observed in the field of security 
and defence policy. 
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Security: towards strategic autonomy? 
The EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy − in 
which the term geopolitics does not appear yet – started a 
process of closer cooperation in security and defence. “An 
appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is 
important for Europe’s ability to foster peace and 
safeguard security within and beyond its borders” (EEAS, 
2016, 9). This quest for more strategic autonomy, that is, 
the ability to make decisions in foreign, security and 
defence policy and have the means to carry these through, 
if need be also alone, has been reinforced by the 
uncertainty about the United States’ continued 
commitment to the transatlantic alliance amidst the 
repeated calls of US President Trump for more burden-
sharing in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
Yet, there are different opinions on how to deal with this 
strategic transatlantic estrangement and work towards a 
European security and defence Union. As Leonard (2019) 
has aptly summarised, some member states led by France 
– the EU’s only nuclear power post-Brexit – want to reduce 
Europe’s dependence on the US and achieve strategic 
autonomy, while another group around Poland is keen to 
strengthen the transatlantic relationship (‘strategic 
servitude’); finally, Germany and others hope that after 
Trump’s term(s) in office a return to the status quo ante 
would ensue (‘strategic patience’).  
In 2017 the European Defence Fund (EDF) was launched to 
promote defence-related research and the development 
of joint European military capabilities, and the Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) among 25 member states 
was established. A year later, the European Commission 
(2018b) proposed to pass from unanimity to qualified 
majority voting under the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy in the case of human rights in multilateral fora, 
sanctions policy and civilian missions. In these debates, 
even those member states that do not fully support the 
concept of strategic autonomy argue that the EU should 
develop more defence capabilities. Important decisions 
are however still pending. The EU has also updated its 
cyber defence policy as a contribution to strategic 
autonomy. Many emerging technologies have dual uses, 
rendering digital issues even more important.  
Digital technology: towards standard-setting supremacy? 
The global race to supremacy in new digital technologies, 
including next-generation mobile technology (5G), 
artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things raises 
questions of network security and vulnerability of critical 
infrastructures. The US, China and Europe compete with 
different approaches to capture market shares and set 
international standards. 
In the 5G race, for example, the US pursues mainly 
industry-driven standards and investments, whereas 
China runs a government-coordinated programme with 
high levels of public investment. The European 
Commission has taken a ‘middle-road’ approach with the 
choice of a public-private partnership (see Gu et al., 2019). 
As an importer of some strategically important resources 
and technologies Europe is caught in the ‘tech Cold War’ 
between Washington and Beijing. The recent EU 
guidelines recommend member states to diversify and 
restrict or exclude high-risk 5G vendors (like Huawei) from 
core parts of their telecommunications networks 
(European Commission, 2020b). 
All three powers also seek to play an important role in the 
standard-setting process. Although the EU might have a 
less developed tech sector, it attempts to become a global 
rule-maker, particularly with regard to privacy and ethics 
in artificial intelligence. The ‘Brussels effect’ captures the 
EU’s power to regulate global markets, for instance with 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), chemical 
or food standards. Bradford (2020) argues that a single 
regulatory jurisdiction is able to supply global standards if 
it has a large domestic market, sufficient regulatory 
capacity, the political will to set stringent rules to protect 
consumers, and if corporations voluntarily opt to extend 
the rules of the most stringent regulator to their global 
operations. While the EU’s GDPR is based on the premises 
that the individuals own their personal data, the US 
approach again relies more on private companies and 
China on the state. There are thus three distinct data 
realms emerging with different approaches to govern 
cross-border data flows. 
A high level of economic, cultural and political 
attractiveness (including value-based standards such as 
environmental, public health or labour standards and 
human rights) − or soft power − can thus be a main asset 
for the EU’s quest for geopolitical capacity. By contrast, 
the ‘sharp power’ of authoritarian states like China or 
Russia that perforates the political environments in the 
targeted countries through the use of censorship, 
disinformation and manipulation is not part of the EU’s 
diplomatic toolbox.  
Values: towards regional and global leadership?  
The EU perceives itself as a community of values. These 
values are those of liberal democracies and a strong 
support for a multilateral rules-based order. Human rights 
conditionality is part of EU external action ranging from 
the European Neighbourhood Policy to trade and 
development policy.  
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On the global level, the EU engages in international 
cooperation for the protection of public goods (such as 
peace, climate stability, a rules-based trade system, 
financial stability, or public health). Whereas the US has in 
recent years adopted more unilateralist policies, China still 
has to fully live up to its global responsibilities and related 
domestic reforms. For the EU, there is often scope to 
cooperate with both sides. For example, in January 2020, 
the EU, Japan and the US agreed on how to modernise the 
rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on industrial 
subsidies and pressed advanced members (like China) to 
renounce their developing country status. At the same 
time, the EU and a group of 16 WTO members, including 
China, established an ad hoc appeal body to overcome the 
US blockage of the dispute settlement system.  
The US and China are the world’s largest greenhouse gas 
emitters, and together with the EU responsible for more 
than half of the global emissions. Whereas US policy has 
turned towards climate scepticism, China has gone the 
opposite way, moving closer to the EU position. Following 
President Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the 
2015 Paris Agreement, the EU and China have emerged as 
the potential leaders in this field. Both seem to embrace 
climate policy not only as an economic burden but also as 
an opportunity, investing in green technology as a growth 
strategy. The European Green Deal announced by the new 
European Commission (2019, 2) “aims to transform the EU 
into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, 
resource-efficient and competitive economy where there 
are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050”. This 
new prestige project still lacks a clear external dimension 
(e.g. via EU development cooperation) even though “[t]he 
ecological transition will reshape geopolitics” (ibid., 21).  
China’s prestige project is its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
The BRI is not only an infrastructure development and 
investment tool, but a core foreign policy with geopolitical 
underpinnings. Financing and constructing, and 
sometimes even owning or operating, physical and digital 
infrastructure abroad helps gaining control over goods, 
services and data and spreading Chinese technical 
standards. In this context, however, China’s ‘17+1 format’ 
initiative, which promotes the BRI in Central and South-
Eastern Europe, risks hampering EU foreign policy by 
partly muting European opposition, for example over its 
human rights record or its policy in the South China Sea. 
The EU’s response, the EU-Asia connectivity strategy, 
which puts great emphasis on sustainability, has so far 
largely remained a paper tiger.  
The French veto in October 2019 on the start of accession 
talks with Albania and North Macedonia was therefore 
widely seen as a failure of geostrategic thinking, 
permitting Chinese and Russian influence in the region. In 
February 2020, the European Commission (2020a, 1) 
underlined that full EU membership of the Western 
Balkans was “a geostrategic investment in a stable, strong 
and united Europe … at times of heightened geopolitical 
competition”. A more strategic partnership with Africa has 
become increasingly necessary as well. 
Conclusion: geopolitics the European way 
Learning the language of power means learning how to 
use economic tools, data streams, technologies, etc. for 
strategic ends (Borrell, 2020). First, a geopolitical 
Commission that can translate the EU’s (economic and 
soft) power into strategic leverage would require a more 
integrated approach both in terms of horizontal coherence 
across policies and vertical coherence between the EU 
level and the member states. Such an integrated approach 
is easier to achieve for states than for the European Union 
with its panoply of legal competences.  
Second, a geopolitical Commission that is more hard-
nosed in pursuing EU interests should not do so at the 
expense of promoting EU values by, for instance, 
redirecting aid funds from small, poor countries to 
geopolitically more important ones, or subordinating 
trade policy to a broader agenda that would disregard the 
very principle of multilateralism.  
Third, a geopolitical Commission would need to be 
complemented by a geopolitical European External Action 
Service (EEAS) and a geopolitical (European) Council. All 
institutions would need to adopt a more strategic mind-
set and break down policy silos. The Commission, for 
example, would need to give the EEAS a bigger role in a 
more strategic ‘partnership of equals’ with Africa, and it 
would need to add external dimensions to key initiatives 
such as the European Green Deal. 
Fourth, such a more geopolitical EU would have to 
decrease its vulnerability to external pressure and 
reinforce its resilience and ability to defend own interests 
and values. In other words, it has to take steps towards 
more strategic autonomy and economic sovereignty such 
as those outlined above.  
Fourth, a more geopolitical EU should not only address 
geopolitical competition but also develop new positive-
sum ‘geopolitical cooperation’ beyond its traditional 
transatlantic or Western partnerships.  
To conclude, a geopolitical EU will have to find its very own 
geopolitical strategy. As Ursula von der Leyen (2019) said 
in her candidacy speech to the European Parliament: ‘We 
have to do it the European way.’  
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